Taking the fight to the real issue

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Does God exist?

My answer is simple: No. God does not exist.

There are three basic approaches I will express:

1) Dysteleology: This world does not look like what it is reasonable to expect with a perfectly loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful being. There is too much suffering. There are too many poorly designed components of the world. (assuming basic models of purpose for a God) The things that are often considered important within this framework do not exist.

2) Theological incoherence: Many theologies about God, such as the most popular efforts, are themselves incoherent. For this reason, we are justified to be skeptical of the idea of God's existence. This can include notions of hell and compatibility with love. This can include divine behavioral issues. This can include various doctrines. Just the sheer presence of these issues, which seem to discredit the theisms that try to claim empirical founding, is evidence against most theisms.

3) The lack of necessity: God is not a necessary hypothesis for understanding the universe. Instead, we have a lot of scientific findings that make less sense with the existence of God, such as evolution, which takes a lot of time for a less optimal outcome and involves a lot of suffering in its processes. Even further, attempts to make God fill the gaps are often pushed back by an ongoing scientific progress. The issue being that if God explains no part of our reality, then he is unnecessary to assume, and by Occam's razor, getting rid of God in our assumptions makes the most sense.

EDIT: Also, more importantly, the religions that we see in practice are false, an issue that I will be willing to address in this thread.

Last edited by Awesomelyglorious on 13 Nov 2010, 11:45 am, edited 1 time in total.

Beyond lack of necessity, there's lack of observation. There is no reason to believe a deity exists in day to day observation. Almost everything can be explained rationally except in cases where information is missing...but missing information isn't a deity; it's just a lack of information or full context.

Does God Exist?

AG Firstly I will argue that the arguments you have made are not really that convincing.

Dysteleology: In order for the argument of Dysteleology to be true one would first have to suppose that the teleological argument for the existence of God is not true. Therefor my discussion of this will take place there.

Theological incoherence: The fact that people do not understand God, who is a divine, all knowing, all loving being is not grounds for arguing that he does not exist. God is supposed to be at least in part impossible to understand.

The lack of necessity: In order for this argument to be true basically every argument I will put forward next would have to be untrue. I will leave that to the readers to decide. (FYI; you know Occam was a monk right?)

My Argument

What people should first know is that I am not the best person to make this case. If you do not find it convincing or even if you do; do not let this be the end of your investigation into these arguments. I will provide links so you can find more information.

Either way; I hope you find this interesting.

A good outline on all of the arguments presented here

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/New ... le&id=8088

Before you bring up a counter argument here please look for the answer here and consider sending you question to Dr. Craig to be answered (it will defiantly do you more good than asking me or this board):
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/Pag ... _a_archive


Over the last 20 years or so there has been a quiet revolution taking place in the real of philosophy. In a field that used to reject the concept of God.

The noted American philosopher Roderick Chisholm opined that the reason atheism was so influential in the previous generation is that the brightest philosophers were atheists; but today, he observes, many of the brightest philosophers are theists, using a tough-minded intellectualism in defense of that belief.

The Arguments for Deism (these arguments do not argue for the Christian God but for any God) if you want an arugment relating to the Christian God; set up another topic and I'll most likely make an argument there.

1. The Cosmological Argument from Contingency

Outline of the logical argument:

1) Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.

2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.

3) The universe exists.

4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1, 3).

5) Therefore, the explanation of the universe’s existence is God (from 2, 4).

Premise One: Consider first premise 1. According to premise 1, there are two kinds of things: things which exist necessarily and things which are produced by some external cause. Let me explain.

Things that exist necessarily exist by a necessity of their own nature. It’s impossible for them not to exist. Many mathematicians think that numbers, sets, and other mathematical entities exist in this way. They’re not caused to exist by something else; they just exist necessarily.

Everything needs an explanation; string theory, the universe or even the multi-verse. The size of the object does not exempt it from needing an explanation of its existence. If you want to understand this further; consider Schopenhauer's 'taxicab fallacy'.

Premise Two:

So what does the atheist almost always say in response to the contingency argument? He typically asserts the following:

A. If atheism is true, the universe has no explanation of its existence.

Since, on atheism, the universe is the ultimate reality, it just exists as a brute fact. But that is logically equivalent to saying this:

B. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, then atheism is not true.

So you can’t affirm (A) and deny (B). But (B) is virtually synonymous with premise 2! (Just compare them.) So by saying that, given atheism, the universe has no explanation, the atheist is implicitly admitting premise 2: if the universe does have an explanation, then God exists.

Conclusion:

From these premises it follows that God exists. Now if God exists, the explanation of God’s existence lies in the necessity of his own nature, since, as even the atheist recognizes, it’s impossible for God to have a cause. So if this argument is successful, it proves the existence of a necessary, uncaused, timeless, spaceless, immaterial, personal Creator of the universe.

2. The Kalam Cosmological Argument

1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2) The universe (or multi-verse) began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

The prominent New Atheist philosopher Daniel Dennett agrees that the universe has a cause, but he thinks that the cause of the universe is itself! Yes, he’s serious. In what he calls “the ultimate boot-strapping trick,” he claims that the universe created itself.

Dennett’s view is plainly nonsense. Notice that he’s not saying that the universe is self-caused in the sense that it has always existed. No, Dennett agrees that the universe had an absolute beginning but claims that the universe brought itself into being. But this is clearly impossible, for in order to create itself, the universe would have to already exist. It would have to exist before it existed! Dennett’s view is thus logically incoherent. The cause of the universe must therefore be a transcendent cause beyond the universe.

FYI Even Dawkins states that this argument must be true: he however, does not think the creator of the Universe(multiverse) is God.

3. The Moral Argument (this argument cannot apply to Islam; because they do not hold that objective values and God are one and the same; which is inconsistent any argument for the existence of God based upon the nature of God)

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.
This has been addressed pretty comprehensively in the thread on ‘Christians are bad for society’

4. The Teleological Argument from Fine-tuning

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design.

Premise One:

Premise 1 simply lists the three possibilities for explaining the presence of this amazing fine-tuning of the universe: physical necessity, chance, or design. The first alternative holds that there’s some unknown Theory of Everything (TOE) that would explain the way the universe is. Ithad to be that way, and there was really no chance or little chance of the universe’s not being life-permitting. By contrast, the second alternative states that the fine-tuning is due entirely to chance. It’s just an accident that the universe is life-permitting, and we’re the lucky beneficiaries. The third alternative rejects both of these accounts in favor of an intelligent Mind behind the cosmos, who designed the universe to permit life. The question is this: Which of these alternatives is the best explanation?

Premise Two:

Premise 2 of the argument addresses that question. Consider the three alternatives. The first alternative, physical necessity, is extraordinarily implausible because, as we’ve seen, the constants and quantities are independent of the laws of nature. So, for example, the most promising candidate for a TOE to date, super-string theory or M-Theory, fails to predict uniquely our universe. String theory allows a “cosmic landscape” of around 10500 different possible universes governed by the present laws of nature, so it does nothing to render the observed values of the constants and quantities physically necessary. With respect to this first alternative, Dawkins notes that Sir Martin Rees rejects this explanation, and Dawkins says, “I think I agree.”

So what about the second alternative, that the fine-tuning of the universe is due to chance? The problem with this alternative is that the odds against the universe’s being life-permitting are so incomprehensibly great that they can’t be reasonably faced. Even though there will be a huge number of life-permitting universes lying within the cosmic landscape, nevertheless the number of life-permitting worlds will be unfathomably tiny compared to the entire landscape, so that the existence of a life-permitting universe is fantastically improbable. Students or laymen who blithely assert, “It could have happened by chance!” simply have no conception of the fantastic precision of the fine-tuning requisite for life. They would never embrace such a hypothesis in any other area of their lives—for example, in order to explain how there came to be overnight a car in their driveway.

Dawkins has attacked this position quite aggressively; a comprehensive rubuttle from leading cosmologists has already taken place. It can be found here (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/New ... le&id=8088 Section 4.3.1-4.3.3)

5. The Ontological Argument from the Possibility of God’s Existence to His Actuality

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

It might surprise you to learn that steps (2)–(6) of this argument are relatively uncontroversial. Most philosophers would agree that if God’s existence is even possible, then he must exist. The principal issue to be settled with respect to Plantinga’s ontological argument is what warrant exists for thinking the key premise “It is possible that a maximally great being exists” to be true.

Dawkins devotes six full pages, brimming with ridicule and invective, to the ontological argument, without raising any serious objection to Plantinga’s argument. He notes in passing Immanuel Kant’s objection that existence is not a perfection; but since Plantinga’s argument doesn’t presuppose that it is, we can leave that irrelevance aside. He reiterates a parody of the argument designed to show that God does not exist because a God “who created everything while not existing” is greater than one who exists and creates everything. Ironically, this parody, far from undermining the ontological argument, actually reinforces it. For a being who creates everything while not existing is a logical incoherence and is therefore impossible: there is no possible world that includes a non-existent being that creates the world. If the atheist is to maintain—as he must—that God’s existence is impossible, the concept of God would have to be similarly incoherent. But it’s not. That supports the plausibility of premise (1).

(A good response to Dawkins can be found here)

(http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/New ... le&id=6831)

Well, there is a conflict between the two positions.


The argument is incoherence, not lack of understanding.


Yes, but his religious views are irrelevant to his razor.


No, I am arguing with you, not Dr. Craig. I know most of these arguments already.


Atheism is still a vast majority in the field of philosophy with many of the brightest minds still as atheists in this field. What was rebutted was the ideas of logical positivism, which held that the word "God" had no meaning.


Premise 2 is explicitly begging the question, as you assumed what in this context, needed to be proved.

The entire argument is assuming God's necessity, a problem given that one would have to uphold the idea that God is required in all possible realities, a point that no atheist is going to concede without argument. So, assuming that fact just won't really get us anywhere.

Even further, the deeper issues of the metaphysics of reality are a difficult thing, and by difficult, I really mean that nobody, even philosophers, knows what the hell they're talking about.

As for the existence of the universe, I won't play around with notions of "necessity". Here's the options I see:
1) The impossibility of nothing to exist.
2) The possibility of an infinite past, just across universes, for instance with a chaotic inflation model.
3) The necessity of all possible universes existing. (I believe one of the arguments in modal logic requires that all possible universes actually exist somewhere. Given that our universe is possible, this means it is actual. I don't believe this argument much, but it is more plausible than God given what is entailed.)


That's interesting, because William Lane Craig believes that his argument fails if the mainstream theory of time, B theory, fails.

"From start to finish, the kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived." - The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, pp. 183-184

The issue is that the B theory is what is generally justified by modern physics. That is that the unreality of time is supported by Einsteinian relativity, given that one of the consequences of relativity is that the simultaneity of events is relative, rather than absolute. So, notions of time that give weight to our notion of "present" end up failing because the category does not exist.

Even further, this isn't Craig's entire argument, as in order to get to your point on the existence of God, he has to argue about the nature of this cause. The problem is that all of his arguments in this direction end up being highly questionable, invoking ideas such as a "timeless mind", among a lot of other issues.

Now, the problem is that atheism doesn't really have to have a problem with this:
1) If atheists accept the B theory of time, and it is more popular among philosophers, then there is no problem, as the universe, being a four-dimensional block, has always existed.
2) Even if we do accept the A theory of time, the idea of an infinite cross-universe past is still a possibility.
3) Just taking the argument at its face, any cause will work. I think philosopher Quentin Smith argued that a 0 dimensional point sufficiently upheld the argument, and thus was acceptable.

(That being said: I don't care what Dawkins, an evolutionary biologist without real background in philosophy, thinks. I also think that if Dennett really did speak on this issue, it is probable that he was not functioning in his proper domain of expertise. Dennett is a philosopher of mind and biology, not a metaphysicist.)


Yes, and I have rebutted most of it as well.

God is not simple, as simplicity involves that God be his properties. Given the transitivity of identity, this requires that these properties be each other, so justice is kindness is omnipotence. Even further, abstract qualities being impersonal, are irreconcilable with a personal notion of God. And of course, for God to do fine-tuning, we have to have cognition, cognition at the abstract level, as recognized by cognitive science, is not "do this", but rather a very complicated and difficult process that there is still a difficulty creating a sufficient logical model of.

If God is not simple, then there is a modified Euthyphro.


Actually, the issue isn't nullifying possibilities, as that's relatively difficult, but rather ranking them.

Now, given that I consider a multiverse a real possibility, I don't consider chance a real problem. So, here's the ranking I'd give:
1) Chance
2) Laws
3) God

I'd rank laws above God, because high metaphysics is difficult, so to say that the possibility. However, I do not regard it as a real possibility that a loving God would create a world with the amount, degree, and extent of suffering there is and will be. I also do not regard it as a real possibility that God would create a world that is so easily explicable by nature, even when divine action could do a better job, this holds for things like the workings of evolution. Evolution makes a lot of sense given naturalism, but almost no sense given a being defined in a manner that God is, as the process is basically guaranteed to have sub-optimal outcomes. Any notion of teleology, will have to defend the necessity/goodness of the unseen galaxies, or even the seen but unreachable universe and the massive time-scale, it will have to defend the conclusions of these theologies that include billions

Even further cognition is so difficult, supposing a divine mind is an explanatory failure.

Basically, the issue is that given the amount of processing a mind has to do, and the detail and difficulty of it, it makes no sense to claim "mind" as a basic category, but rather in reality we find minds. These minds are all very complex. Well, the issue is that God, to have a mind capable of massive divine planning, and to have functionality beyond the human mind, is best understood as having the most complicated mind, simply because the processes engaged in have such immense requirements. And in fact, the idea of a supposing a mind without other evidences for it, to explain something just ends up being so improbable because we are having to suppose an extremely rare, and extremely complex thing to explain something that is still possibly explicable by other possibilities. Even something that seems basically incompatible with other known facts, as stated earlier.



The problem with your ontological argument is the following argument.

1'. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.
2'. If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.
3'. If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.
4'. If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world.
5'. If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being does not exist.
6'. Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.

There is no reason to consider this argument worse than your argument. All I did was invert premise 1, and the rest follows. 2' follows because of the nature of probability. 3' follows, because If A then B, means If not B, then not A. If a maximally great being existing in some world entails existing in every world, then the non-existence of this being in one world, means that this being does not exist in any world. 4' just follows. 5' just follows. Both are irrelevant, but I needed them for parody. Finally, we end up with 6'.

The issue is that given that 1 and 1' are mutually incompatible by the logic driving Plantinga's argument, the ontological argument fails to get us anywhere at all. After all, you can't just suppose that the belief "God does not exist in some universe" is false to start your argument. No opponent will buy this.

Even further, the basic logic of Plantinga's argument is so flexible that it really is compatible with anything.

1. It is possible that a most effectively evil being exists.
2. If it is possible that a most effectively evil being exists, then a most effectively evil being exists in some possible world.
3. If a most effectively evil being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a most effectively evil being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a most effectively evil being exists in the actual world, then a most effectively evil being exists.
6. Therefore, a most effectively evil great being exists.

You might object to premise 3, but the issue is that it is the evil of a being is more effective if it is present in more locations. So, our evil being can do more bad, if it can impact both world A, and world B, rather than if it could only impact world A. And based upon this reasoning, it extends to each and every world. The problem is that a most effectively evil being is incompatible with the existence of God, as the two beings lead to a dualistic theology. (both are equal in powers, but different in values)

The two are actually the same. If there is an observation that God explains, then God may be necessary. But if God is not necessary, then no observation requires him.

91: I am a Christian, but I dislike poor reasoning. (I am also a math major)

Right, most of the "proofs" of God's existence argue for only a deistic God, and do almost nothing to support Christianity. You are still left wondering if maybe the Norse had it right all along.


Incorrect. You did not demonstrate your premise that the universe has an contingent explanation.


Useless. You are only left with the question of the cause of God, which must be even more intractable than explaining the cause of the universe.


You have not demonstrated premise 2 in the least, either here or in the other thread. Nor have you actually demonstrated premise 1. Most of your arguments in relation to premise 2 are basically just begging the question. Presuppositional apologetics are lame.


Incredibly weak at every single step. You have not demonstrated that the universe is "fine-tuned," and without doing so your entire argument just collapses as meaningless babble. And the rejection of the chance hypothesis is based on a completely wrong notion of probability. My existence is absurdly unlikely, less likely in fact than the made-up numbers apologists often quote for the odds of the Earth being "fine-tuned" for life. And yet I exist by chance. The same is true for you and every other individual human who has ever lived. The combination of all those billions of extremely unlikely entities in the particular combination that they've existed in has a probability of approximately zero.


But you do have to actually demonstrate premise 1.

Pot meet kettle. Orwell, if you look at premise 1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause, it only applies to things that began to exist. God never began existing, but rather God has always existed. Therefore, there is no reason to look for the cause of God. You engaged in poor reasoning. (it doesn't help though that the argument isn't complete as it stands)


Actually, the moral argument has reached outside of presuppositional apologetics. It is used by standard apologists. I mean, I suppose it is sort of in the same category in that both are transcendental arguments, but I usually consider presuppositionalism to be the approach that stems from Cornelius Van Til and Gordon Clark.


Ok, that's a workable objection. I mean, there is a lot of back and forth on that, and I don't like the objection, but I won't begrudge you for this.


Well.... actually, I don't think so. "Possibility" is a weak term. Now that I've attacked the argument on a number of grounds, yes, he does have to demonstrate premise 1 as better than a lot of the other possibilities at this point. Part of the issue is also going to be the nature of possibility. There is the notion of "possible based upon my knowledge of reality", so things like Hitler being a drag queen on weekends might be possible to me. There is also the notion of "logically possible". The issue is that the former and the latter aren't the same. For instance, earlier mathematicians likely believed that a consistent and provably consistent set was possible, and perhaps even that it existed, but later ones know it isn't logically possible.

I will ask:

Why would anyone who does not believe in God try to make converts to his religion?

I will ask again:

Why would anyone who knows God respond to such a person?

I will say:

If you do not believe I exist it changes me not one whit - but I can't help you get your car out of the snowdrift.

THE ABOVE IS NOT A CLAIM THAT I AM GOD

We're concerned about the mental health of the world and the dangerous situation that religions create.

AG and Orwell: This is going to be a LONG response

1. The Cosmological Argument from Contingency

You are arguing. Does God exist not does the Christian God exist. Quoting what you see as biblical inconsistency does not get you anywhere near your supposition.



Begging the question and making the case are not the same thing. Whereas the Ontological Argument clearly does get close to explicitly begging the question since it is based upon the contingency in the first argument. Your invoking of begging the question is wrong: you confuse necessity de re with necessity de dicto. Necessity de re is the necessity of a thing (res); necessity de dicto is the necessity of a statement (dictum).

Your invoking of the possibility of an infinite past is nonscientific. The universe is expanding, therefor it is theoretically infinite in relation to the future. But we know for a fact that it had a beginning. Bestowing a factor on the reality before the existence of time essentially names an attribute of what would be otherwise be called God. If you argued this YOU would be begging the question.

The argument is persuasive and acts in a way that is a better explanation than to suppose that from nothing comes nothing. Also see response to Orwell in relation to a situation of infinite time.

Orwell



I only intend to argue to the topic. Also I would not contend that my reasoning was poor. But it is brief.



I thought it was obvious that whatever begins to exist has a cause. If however we assume the Universe to be timeless then we can take the view of Gottfried Leibniz 'Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason [...] is found in a substance which [...] is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself.'

2. The Kalam Cosmological Argument



Yes, this is true. But the mainstream theory of time has not failed. If it did the Kalam argument would fail but not the cosmological argument.



This argument is predicated on three things

1) That B theory of time is correct
2) The cosmological argument is invalid
3) And its does not answer 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'

Orwell



This is an invocation of Infinite Regress. One does not need to prove how God exists to prove the existence of God. Suppose in order to accept the universe exists one had to explain how the universe exists; it is easy to see how invoking Infinite Regress causes circular arguments.

3. The Moral Argument



Why do you think God's nonphysical cognition should be anything like our extremely limited concept of cognition?

4. The Teleological Argument from Fine-tuning





I had asked people to look at the website before responding. Obviously no one listened. Here is a quote from the site that answers the contention I did not make the case that the universe is fine tuned.

'For example, a change in the strength of the atomic weak force by only one part in 10*100 would have prevented a life-permitting universe. The cosmological constant which drives the inflation of the universe and is responsible for the recently discovered acceleration of the universe’s expansion is inexplicably fine-tuned to around one part in 10*120. Roger Penrose of Oxford University has calculated that the odds of the Big Bang’s low entropy condition existing by chance are on the order of one out of 10*10(123). Penrose comments, “I cannot even recall seeing anything else in physics whose accuracy is known to approach, even remotely, a figure like one part in 10*10(123). And it’s not just each constant or quantity that must be exquisitely finely-tuned; their ratios to one another must be also finely-tuned. So improbability is multiplied by improbability by improbability until our minds are reeling in incomprehensible numbers.'

Yes you are right that it is improbable that you should exist and from that we cannot deduce design because it is likely that something should exist. However design can be inferred if the rates of chance conform to a pattern. For instance it is unlikely that you will get a royal flush in a hand of poker but one on its own does not confirm design. However, if one kept getting royal flushes the whole way along then one could infer that this has less to do with chance and more to do with design. I encourage you to check out many of the other variables and then consider if you can infer design upon that basis.

The issue I can see I am going to have here is that this thread is just too vast. If you want to argue every little detail I will give it a go. Give me a bit of a break however, I should not have to reproduce a textbooks worth of information when most of the answers are freely available if one cares to look for them.

5. The Ontological Argument from the Possibility of God’s Existence to His Actuality

AG and Orwell

I understand that one has to demonstrate premise one. But if one considers that God is even remotely possible in any universe, then this train of logic takes care of the rest.

Also AG when you invert the argument you only confirm the power of the logic. If you hold that a God can evolve at the complex end of a universe (or in any other way) then the logic kind of takes care of itself.

What it comes down to is what you consider more likely.

Well, the argument here is that mainstream theology fails. Are you actually defending Deism? No. Almost nobody is a Deist. The issue is that if all accepted forms of theism fail, then this constitutes evidence for the notion that theism is false.

Even further, I am not opposed to arguing whether the Christian God exists in this thread. If you want, I'll just edit my OP, and so it will be part of the discussion. I named this thread "taking the fight to the real issue", the real issue is often the Christian God. So, let's argue that issue. Does the Christian God exist.


Well, no, I am not making a mistake. The ontological argument isn't so much close to begging the question, but this argument is. You presupposed God's existence within the proof you were using for God's existence. That's pretty explicit.

Even further, my talk on necessity had nothing to do with my talk on begging the question. It is really that, if God is necessary, then the existence of God ought to be able to prove itself, such as with an ontological argument. Ontological arguments generally fail. As such, we can't suppose the necessity of God ABOVE the necessity of other things, that also have no way to non-problematically argue for the necessity of their existence.


It is arguably non-scientific, but it isn't anti-scientific. The issue is that we know THIS universe had a beginning, that does not mean the beginning couldn't stem from an earlier universe. In fact, there are scientific cosmological models oriented towards the possibility of an infinite past. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaotic_Inflation_theory


Not really, no. The argument begs the question.


Right, but in order to do that, you'd have to argue for necessary existence and about the nature of necessary existence. The issue is that in order to do that, we'd have to go into necessity, and hold that God is necessary, while other things are not. Assuming that God is necessary, but that other possibilities are false is insufficient argumentation, a point I made earlier.


Oy, I misstated it. Here's it more properly:
Mainstream theory of time (theory B) is incompatible with the Kalam.
It has not failed.
Therefore, the Kalam is unnecessary.

Sorry for the misstatement, I would have hoped that by quoting Craig, you would have seen my point.


Actually, I presented three possibilities.

1) The B theory of time is correct, because Einsteinian relativity can be taken as correct. Most physicists are explicit on the matter that it is correct, and Craig's efforts to overturn it are generally rejected on the grounds that they lack the major explanatory virtues.

2) I didn't assume the cosmological argument to be invalid anywhere. I assumed an infinite chain of causes would satisfy it, and it does.

3) Saying "God created everything" doesn't answer the question either. God is something. You can't say "something exists" to answer the question of "why is there something?". It just doesn't work.


Cognitive science isn't a discipline of neurology. It doesn't describe just how I or you think. It describes the logically elements of cognitive processing. I would tend to think that anything is limited by logically necessary requirements.


You haven't rebutted my position. If there is a multiverse, then none of the fine-tuning provided matters, because there could be infinite possible universes.

We still cannot prove that there are no cosmological laws that require our universe.

Finally, there are things in this universe that strongly suggest that God does not exist. Even further, a mind is a complicated thing, therefore most other suppositions are simpler. A multiverse is a simpler thing to suppose than a mind. And even if you argue "well, what about DIVINE minds!?@!", the problem is that we have no grounding to believe that such a thing can even exist or work, and I believe there are Godelian arguments against something that even does have any qualities like what you want to invoke as having.


Hunh???? No, I don't. Inverting the argument is called "reductio ad absurdum", it destroys the power of the logic.

I don't hold that God can evolve. Period. Is this an effort to invoke Frank Tipler's Omega point? That's a different argument than the ontological argument. I also don't think that manipulation of the sort is even possible to evolve. Finally, there is no reason why an Omega point would be a "greatest possible being" and as such, wouldn't be associated with perfect being theology.

Last edited by Awesomelyglorious on 13 Nov 2010, 2:32 pm, edited 1 time in total.

It varies on the religion. I don't have a religion. I mostly do this out of amusement, and for the social pleasures, and because the issue has caught my attention and I am quite argumentative.


Lots of reasons. So that way this person doesn't lead people away from God.


BLASPHEMY! QUIT LYING TO US, LORD AND SAVIOR! GRANT ME A PONY!

That would make the topic even bigger than it already is. I think it is too big at the moment.



I am not a Deist however, as Dawkins states getting to Deism is one thing; getting to Theism is another.




I still hold that it is not begging the question based on the reason I already gave.



Even the best scientists consider Inflation Theory to be not actually good enough to properly explain things. There is consensus among most physicists that it exists as a placeholder until a better explanation arrives.



Sorry, I still contend that it doesn't.




You are still supposing what a maximal being could be based upon how you can conceive a maximal being existing.



We are arguing for the existence of God. Many theoretical roads lead to Rome.

Also you should be careful invoking infinity in relation to the multiverse. There is no reason to think that the laws of mathematics do not exist in such universes and therefor they are limited by the possible combinations of those laws.

AG

Lets be reasonable shall we? Neither of us is going to convince the other.

We can each make a reasonable case as to why the reasonable person should believe what we believe but neither of us can provide sufficient evidence to convince an unreasonable person (which we both clearly are).

I think I have put forward enough to send an inquisitive person looking on their own (which is my only real aim) and you have stated the case for atheism. You have done it well, though I still contend that probabilistically speaking; my argument is more powerful, but neither of us will convince the other of the truth of that statement.

You are one of the best atheists I have taken on and I will no doubt take you on again; but this topic is just too huge. We could struggle till entropy or judgement and still only meet back at the beginning. So I propose that we stop and focus on arguing over smaller targets? What do you think?

You assume God's existence in the 2nd premise. That's explicitly begging the question in a thread on proofs of God's existence.


You do realize that this is irrelevant. God is even less scientific than inflation theory. Certainly though, having an explanation of a non-theistic sort rebuts any proof of God.


I don't know what to say. You literally stated: "2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.", which is problematic because for God to explain, God must first exist. Now, if we argued properties, this might make more sense, and used those properties to arrive at God. However, just stating "God" is quite problematic.


And your notions of God avoid that? Perhaps the maximal being is the tastiest of all hot dogs! Cognition, by all of our studies, is a complicated process involving a lot of various structures. I don't see why language about "maximal being" really should change my understanding of cognition. More of an argument is necessary.


Yes, but the arguments are not even related.


If we hold to the idea of "possible worlds", then yes, we both have something that is practically infinite, if not actually infinite, but something that is also always logically valid. The question is then the relationship of math to logic. However, if we hold that logic is intrinsically related to meaning, then yes, logic holds in all universes, simply because logic relates to description.


Actually, I only think that you are an unreasonable person.


I entirely disagree.

First of all, I have not actually put forward very much of a strong case for atheism. I placed the basic framework expecting that agreeing individuals could recognize it, and disagreeing individuals could be challenged by it, but this stuff is so obvious that it hardly needs an argument so much as a rebuttal to those who attack it. Mostly I have simply rebutted your arguments. Even further, most of your arguments are fatally flawed. The Ontological argument just literally broke into pieces. The Kalam requires that mainstream physics is denied, and even if one accepts the logic, one can still avoid a theistic notion without problem. I believe that the contingency cosmological argument either is, or is extremely close to begging the question. So.... what do you have left? The teleological argument? What about the dysteleology we see across nature? I mean, evolution, and suffering, do not make as much sense with the notion of the purposes of any God one would consider loving. Finally, the moral argument breaks down if simplicity breaks down, which simplicity does because it entails a lot of absurd conclusions, and as such, we're left with the modified Euthyphro problem suggested by Wes Morriston. So... really, I think that my arguments are just win. If you want me to expand on them, I am perfectly willing to do so.


Ok, fine, how about this:
You suggest a better topic. I'll see if I am interested.

I still don't see this topic as too large. It avoids you trying to push outside of the original scope of my smaller topics to relate it to a larger one. And as such, allows this all to make more sense.

Then please tell me why I no longer have to drink!


Ah, now that kind of discussion could actually go somewhere sane.

I could argue atheism is a religion, a religion that believes there is no deity... If all religions are wrong then therefore Atheism woud be wrong two.


@Awesomelyglorious

I could agree with you but then we would both be wrong.