Atheism apologist Dawkins: Down Syndrome abortions are moral

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I'm sure Corky would LOVE this thread......

How so?

Dawkins's own response to this may be of interest.

[Edit: My post-count is too low to post links. You'll have to find it yourself. The article is on Dawkins's own site; it's called "Abortion & Down Syndrome: An Apology for Letting Slip the Dogs of Twitterwar".]

If we take him at his word, his position can be captured in these two remarks of his:

(A) "Given a free choice of having an early abortion or deliberately bringing a Down child into the world, I think the moral and sensible choice would be to abort."
(B) "Having said that, the choice would be entirely yours and I would never dream of trying to impose my views on you or anyone else."

If you consult Dawkins's article, you'll see that he appears to rest Point (A) above on an appeal to utilitarianism - his belief appears to be that morality requires us to minimize collective suffering and maximize collective happiness.

I'm not sure whether he regards that as the only moral imperative, or if he thinks there are considerations to be made besides those of utility-maximization. Supposing he does, his implicit argument for (A) would go like this:

(1) When people are born with Down Syndrome, the outcome, summed over the lifespans of all affected, is (compared against alternative outcomes) a reduction of happiness and increase of suffering, both for the people who have DS, and for the people who provide care for people with DS.
(2) Morality requires us to avoid as far as possible actions that reduce happiness and promote suffering.
(3) Therefore (from (1) and (2)), morality requires us to avoid as far as possible actions by which people are born with DS.
(4) Early abortions of humans that have DS conduce to the end specified in (3), more-so than any alternative.
(5) Therefore (from (3) and (4)), early abortions of humans that have DS are morally required (provided that circumstances allow the possibility of early abortions).

Now, on this issue, Dawkins presumably maintains (B) - a policy of non-interference in the mother's choice whether to abort - not because he thinks it is morally permissible to bring a child with DS into the world (he evidently doesn't), but because he believes that people (in these circumstances, anyway) have the right to act as their conscience dictates.

For my part, I approve of (B) and have doubts about (1) and (2). In order to rebut (2), I'd have to go into the inadequacies of utilitarianism, but my outlook on that is pretty undeveloped at this point. (1) is also difficult. My brother has DS, and yes, that restricts his freedom and his capabilities, and makes him more vulnerable and dependent; it also creates more responsibilities for his parents and the rest of his family; but temperamentally, he's not an unhappy person, and obviously finds much to enjoy in life; and there's nothing but love between him and the rest of his family. There's also plenty to be said for making society more accommodating to people with DS.

However, from another angle, I could see how a person without DS could easily look at all the things that conduce to her life-satisfaction, recognize that having DS would be a major obstacle if not total impediment to many of those things, and conclude that her life would have been worse if she had had DS. And if a prospective mother makes those considerations, and also does not wish to be responsible for providing basic care to her unborn child for the whole remainder of her life, then I could sympathize with the decision to abort - particularly at the stage of pregnancy at which the child has not developed the neurophysiological capacity for feelings, thoughts, preferences, conscious awareness, or whatever else suffices to make it a sentient organism. (I'm not much moved by appeals to an organism's potential to become sentient.)

None of this is to say that I share Dawkins's confidence that it's a moral requirement to abort children with DS. That seems pretty absurd to me. I just try to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of people's rationales for their decisions on this issue, though I do think it's also absurd to assert that abortion is beyond doubt murder. In a word, I'm pro-choice; moral evaluations are often a difficult business, and it's often (not always) a bad thing for an adult to force his or her morality on another.

"Corky" was the name of the character played by Chris Burke. Corky was the first prominent television character (perhaps the first character, period) with Down's Syndrome.

There are many people with Down's Syndrome who lead happy, productive lives. They are sociable people--and, in an enriching environment, sometimes attain "normal" intelligence. "Normal" intelligence is more common with Mosaic Down Syndrome.

Even if one has strictly "utilitarian" notions pertaining to the "usefulness" of people, it cannot be denied that many people with Down Syndrome contribute to their society at large.

To abort a Down's Syndrome person, to me, solely because he/she has Down's Syndrome, is an immoral and amoral act.

Last edited by kraftiekortie on 25 Aug 2014, 4:38 pm, edited 1 time in total.

How can it be amoral and immoral?

Thank you.

If something lacks morality (amorality), then I find it that goes against the grain of morality (immorality).

I was using both terms together for emphasis.

Agreed.

I have no idea what this means because "lacks morality" is an ambiguous description. I can understand how someone may lack morality, but how does something lack morality?

There's nothing wrong with aborting a fetus with Down's syndrome before it's sentient. Should a woman choose to carry out the pregnancy, she shouldn't have to justify it to anyone, though.

Merriam-Webster, at least, applies it to inanimate objects.

When I say "something," I mean an action, a thought, or an idea--as well as an object.

An action, a thought, or an idea could be "somethings," even though it's not necessarily tangible, like "somethings" purportedly are.

Well if that's so, science is immoral according to kraftiekortie.

But if everything that is amoral is immoral, then nothing is amoral, because "amoral" only describes things that are outside of the realm of morality. But if nothing is amoral, then it's meaningless to say that anything that is amoral runs against the grain of morality, because no such things exist.

This is why I'm confused: this idea creates a paradox.

All wedding and funeral services I've been to have been secular. What is so strange about non-religious people having non-religious weddings and funerals? And if I would be invited for a Christian wedding/funeral I'd show up, but not participate in prayers obviously. I think many atheists know something of what church services are about, it just isn't really important to them. I've never been to a church service but I've seen it on tv, and I know something of what's in the Bible and the history of religion. I don't know many religious people personally because only 28% of Dutch people believe in God/gods, and most of those are apparantly not in my demographic.
Old churches are often kept for their historic value, even if their congregation no longer exists. The last church I've been to was a bar.

There's no paradox.

Obviously, morality is quite subjective, and does not carry the same meaning in every person.

Amorality could be the absence of morals, or could be the absence of the conception of morals. It could exist within the realm of a moral system--in contrast to what is considered moral--or outside of it.

It depends upon one's conception of morals. I have mine, you have yours--we might not agree--but that's what makes the world go round.

It's possible that things done IN THE NAME of science could be immoral. Science, itself, as practiced, frequently exhibits a sound morality.

Ok. So what you meant was that some things that some people consider to be amoral, you consider those same things to be immoral? The way you worded it, it seemed like you were saying that you personally consider some things to be simultaneously immoral and amoral, which is paradoxical, at least on the face of it.



Only if we are talking about sentient creatures. That's why I asked you about "something" lacking morals: the bolded part of your comment here can only apply to someones, not somethings, so I ignored that meaning when I read what you posted about something being amoral.


This is why what you post is confusing: you are talking about things as if they were people. Science (a thing) can be moral (in someone's eyes), but it can't "exhibit" morality. It is a word, an abstract concept, and a practice, but not a person. Scientists can exhibit morality; science cannot.