xenon13 wrote:
Considering the limited extent of the Egyptian offensive and that they really double-crossed the Syrians whose job in their eyes was essentially to be a diversion, and considering Sadat's actions following that, my conclusion is the correct one, and add to that the fact that Sadat signed such a deal later on and did not attack Israel.
Your conclusion lacks objectivity, and smacks of an exercise in bias confirmation.
Your analysis is woefully inadequate, since it fails to incorporate the US-Soviet implications of the Yom Kippur War, it makes not mention of domestic Egyptian challenges to Sadat's continued rule as a motivation for war. It fails to evaluate Meir's decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike. And most importantly it makes the assumption that Sadat's willingness to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel was not influenced by the results of the war.
I suggest that none of the government leaders invovled (Sadat, Meir and Begin) would have been willing to sit down had it not been for the outcomes of the Yom Kippur War. Israeli complacency was deeply affected, and so too was Egyptian confidence. Without the demonstration that neither side could expect military victory over the other, it is unlikely that any peaceful agreement could have been reached.
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--James