AS an artificial delineation

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I'm interested in learning more about that Asperger's conference.

My thoughts? Well I'm not sure if I'd call it a logical fallacy, but from a scientific point of view I'd say go with whether the separate disorders can reliably make predictions, regardless of what the consensus is or what neurology says.

To bring in an analogy, some say that electrons can't be empirically verified but only indirectly tested, and thus we should only state what the studies are and observable principles rather than acting like there are electrons. However, scientists typically allow unobservables into Science, like electrons, because they can make new predictions for what to observe. Likewise, although many are skeptical about quantum theory, it makes testable predictions.

So back to autism spectrum disorders. Although we can't prove there's a difference, if the different disorders can make predictions when separated, then why not, and vice versa? If they can make new predictions in what neurological studies may find, or even how people will actually behave, then we could go from there. If the individual models can make predictions for which interventions are going to be useful, then the differences would seem worthwhile. If not, then I'd be less inclined to say yes. Although everything psychological is also biological, many psychological non autistic spectrum disorders don't have a unique neurological profile that can be detected as of today. However, if they can make predictions in a scientific method manner and are useful in helping people overcome their problems that are at a clinical level, then they're useful.

In Science, going with the model that uses the least amount of assumptions to explain the most amount of facts does not mean "the least amount of assumptions", but rather what explains the most amount of facts using the least assumptions, or least assumptions "to still explain everything that's relevant". Models change over time with new evidence, so that's why you have to use falsification to see if you can possibly bust your way out. However, while waiting in the mean time for falsification to take effect, it may be good to do what fits the evidence the best.

That's what comes to mind.

I guess I need to do some good research on usefulness of individual disorders, and their predictive power.

We empirically experience via experimentation that things react according to the way they would react if the model of what we call an electron were in fact being directly witnessed to exist. We have thereby observed an experiment that would have falsified our hypothesis of the existence of what in our model we named the electron. For practical purposes, there are electrons, because the concept of an electron is consistent with observable data. The aspect of reality that results in this state, is whatever we define as being that. Good critical thinkers are always skeptical until a rational argument is presented that they do not find a flaw they can argue against that discredits the foundation of what it models.

The disorder classifications are more about organizing data for reference than they are about making predictions. There is a manner in which you could collate them to try and make predictions sure, but I'm not sure what you would be hypothesizing at this point. What kind of predictions are you expecting to be made.

This area of mental health is in more of a inductive information gathering stage. Find enough similarities amongst people that have this behavior or that brain chemistry to make a prediction of what is the cause and how best to treat it. They thought they understood how certain things related to serotonin, dopamine and sensory perception and then somebody realized a subset of patients were reacting in a manner the model did not account for. Neurologists made new discoveries using fMRI and came to see a pattern in the blood oxygen levels changes in areas related to sense cognition and are currently trying to collect data regarding which brain structure differences result in what treatable problems for the patient, but it is an emerging area of understanding.

There are very few conditions that are discrete, the natural world doesn't have a bunch of on and off switches like a computer, it has a huge range of different possibilities.


The problem is, the groupings are based on behaviours rather than physical problems. Groupings are essential if one wishes to give appropriate help to an individual

I thought they believe that it's the white matter in the brain, i.e. the "feedback loop" between hemispheres, that causes "misfiring." I guess the question is which side is dominant. Then again, can you be left-brain dominant and HFA?

It is possible although HFA normally correlates with impairments related to the left side of the brain.

If neurology can't say disorders like OCD are special conditions just like Down Syndrome, and we don't take medical tissue samples to diagnose OCD, then it would seem reasonable that determining whether we should make a line between disorders such as low functioning autism and Asperger's (or other spectrum disorders) wouldn't be limited to neurological studies. If there are differences in intervention strategies and behaviors, it would seem prudent that the distinctions could be useful, and if not then I would say it's not useful.



Although "we empirically experience via experimentation that things react according to the way they would react if the model of what we call an electron were in fact being directly witnessed to exist", some in the Philosophy of Science still say we should completely refrain from mentioning any unobservables (like electrons) and only talk about operational definitions/experimental studies. Besides the concept of falsification, something important is falsifiable unobservables/concepts/theories generate new predictions for observable phenomenon, which operational definitions/past experimental studies don't. Some believe falsification is not a good enough excuse for electrons because they're still not directly verifiable and that doesn't make the critics feel good about anything, since Science is supposed to be truth rather than speculation. However, electrons being able to "generate new observable predictions" is considered a good argument by many for allowing unobservables into Science. Scientists go with what uses the least amount of assumptions to still make predictions and explain everything. Even if we can't "verify" the psychological disorder distinctions for sure, if they can make new predictions for interventions/behaviors, then I would think it would be useful to have the distinctions. If not, then I wouldn't be for it.

The definition of a psychological disorder doesn't necessarily mean mental illness or condition, but rather something that causes problems to the point of it being clinical, abnormal, and chronic. Do we have any evidence that "disorders" like OCD are neurological conditions in the same way there's Down Syndrome? Some brain scans find anxiety in the brains of those with OCD, then critics respond that anyone with built up anxiety over time can show the same results on a brain scan. However, if someone is washing their hands and checking locks for six hours a day and it's driving them nuts, we can say that there is a significant problem interfering with the person's life and that interventions may be useful. Although everything psychological is biological, many of the psychological disorders haven't had their neurological basis found yet, and probably won't until neuroscience is that advanced. Does that mean neurology should be the only criteria in making distinctions?

Some say that they don't think HFA/Asperger's is a disability/condition, but rather a different way of life, but instead acts as a disorder/hinderance in some areas, thus it's useful to research social interventions, etc. Back to the analogy of electrons and predictions, if the autism spectrum disorders are separate disorders (abnormal and chronic issues that interfere with one's life to the point that it's clinical), then I would think they should reliably have differences in which interventions are specific in effectiveness and also in how individuals react/behave in different situations. Could that empirical criteria work, from the viewpoint of what the definition of a psychological disorder is? Does it have to be restricted to neurology? For a disorder, we could make predictions for studies, "If this autism spectrum disorder is different, a logical consequence is that effectiveness in interventions should be somewhat different," "If this disorder is really different, then we'd expect that having such and such disorder will tell us these people are going to react differently in these situations." We can determine if the disorder distinctions make predictions in these ways. We can also make them falsifiable because if we use the definition of what a psychological disorder is, then some logical consequences would be they would have differences in interventions to be used. For example, could hypothesis testing studies separate low functioning autism from Asperger's, in interventions and behaviors? Then we could ask ourselves the same thing about high functioning autism versus Asperger's, and so on down the line of disorders.

Again, that's why I'm interested in finding out the research on what separates all of these spectrum disorders, and what peer-review studies say so far about their prediction power.



Using the Scientific Method, you first make observations and then come up with an explanation/principle to test. Then you test it making predictions before the study is conducted. That's why I bring up if the distinctions between the spectrum disorders can reliably make predictions for interventions to be used andbehaviors that will show up in the future.

If it walks like an electron, talks like an electron, and does everything that we define as an electron, it is an electron. I love some philosophy of science and will hang out with you in the halls of philisophical thought for days straight bending our minds, but that has nothing to do with the fact that saying "the electron broke free" is the linguistic equivalent of saying "we have tentatively observed the operationally defined electron breaking free in a manner consistent with our modeling of how operationally defined breaking free events occur" One just makes me sound less pompous. The caveats you suggest are implied by the context of being a human being on planet earth performing this thing called science. If I go around pointing out things people are assumed to know to be participating in the discussion all the time, I'm not going to be very easy to get along with.

Not only do we have evidence suggesting OCD is a neurological condition, we have studies suggesting it is, wait for it, Autistic Spectrum in origin! Psychiatrists have begun associating OCD with one of the set of structural differences we refer to as the spectrum. We are talking about Behavioral issues, affective interventions are going to be incredibly dependent on environmental factors. It is dehumanizing to treat patients as disorders, you treat them as patients and offer assistance to them in how they wish to respond to a disorder. Let me repeat that. Treat the patient, not the disorder. Human beings are not their diseases dysfunctions and disabilities.

Science is not the hypothetico-deductive model, there is no such animal as "the Scientific Method" there is Science and methods used thereby.

I think there was a misunderstanding. I'm not saying that I should go around wording electrons a certain way, nor is my point that the National Academy of Sciences and other organizations say we've never directly observed electrons . Rather, in the hard sciences many say unobservables should be allowed into an empirical environment because they generate new predictions for observable phenomenon that operational definitions/etc don't. Falsification helps test unobservables, although some criticize that as a valid reason to believe in them since it's not actual "verification" (such as General Relativity), but making new predictions makes it practical to have such concepts and means that we can expand our knowledge using them.

So if making the distinction between the various spectrum disorders could assist us in deciding how to help a patient, then why wouldn't it be useful? If we discover it's consistent with hypothesis testing, how would that not be having something (ASD distinctions) generating new predictions (intervention effectiveness in studies)?



That sounds interesting! I've heard that many with Asperger's were diagnosed as OCD earlier. I wonder if there are different types of OCD's, with some related to ASD and some not, or if in general they all are? If you have a link to that, that would interest me.

Here's a question I'm trying to work out, although there are specifics associated with the brains of those with OCD, are they specific only to OCD (not family members or those who are anxious) setting it apart in the same way a test does for the flu?



As far as making the world a better place, do you think the Scientific Method could help those in need? Here's something to consider, although you can't prove in Science, if you over and over again hypothesize, "If this is true or if this intervention works, we predict these observations will happen," don't you think it would at least be practical for use? I mean, if you go into the doctor's for a back problem, wouldn't you want them to use something that has been tested from all sorts of angles with the Scientific Method.



So what would you say separates Science from something that isn't Science? There would be a gradual continuum, but what would you say is the line of demarcation? Since we can't prove in Science, it sometimes changes with new evidence no matter how well tested it is, we can't say it's determined by truth? So do we know what Science is, vs. those who claim their work is Science but in reality isn't? Don't peer-review journals follow the Scientific Method?

I addressed a lot of the meat of your post in another thread Nicks, so I'll hold off and let you respond to that or the PM I sent you. I just wanted to offer up http://www.neuropsychiatryreviews.com/o ... 0_ocd.html as a good article covering what I was talking about from a different angle.