The UCSB shooter--an Aspie with a rant against women

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Will preface by saying I work in science, with scientists, and have done for over a decade. Worked with docs in a med college before that.

Yes, on the whole, they take psychology and psychiatry seriously. They do it mainly because we don't know enough about the brain to do without it yet. Do they regard psychologists as doctors, no, but there's some level of respect.

Evopsych is not taken seriously because it's a transparent attempt at misusing biological science (in boneheaded ways that demonstrate that the evopsych guys don't understand the papers they're reading) to support obviously retrograde social theory. Which annoys biologists, many of whom work in evolution.

You two have missed the point. Also, please show me these men who will reject women who ask them out because, by definition, the asking-out means the woman's too forward.

Oh! I didn't even look at the link carefully. You're right it is from psychology today. You mean Marty Nemko? Well I have some good news for you. He took all of his articles about AS down. Let's just say I was the final catalyst for him taking the article down. I questioned all of his points and asked him to provide specific examples.

Marty no like me very much

Oh, you are a savant goddess, you worked as a pilot, you worked as a social work, and now we find out that you worked as a scientist and as a doctor too!!

Psychiatry is currently like medicine some hundred of years ago, medicine in the recent past was pseudoscience and barbaric and was based on trial and error, and ancient knowledge (which many was false) more than real science; but medicine has evolved from pseudoscience to the real applied science we know today - but psychiatry hasn't yet. The best branch in my opinion of this realm (psychology/psychiatry/evo pschy) is behavioral neuroscience (biological psychology) - because it's organic evidence-based and they check on other animals.

No, but that's my point. They should treat teachers properly but the fact that they don't ultimately is an injustice to males who suffer in an education system that doesn't understand or care to understand them.

And in my country female test scores are higher presumably because men can't put up with pointless sh** like doing tests. And that too is an injustice. If you have a skill, but you can't write it as an answer on a test, then you are f****d. If you can build something with wood or metal or electronics, no one really cares. But if you can spell the word wood or metal or electronics on a test, you are an 'A' student guaranteed to be better than everyone else.

Will preface by saying I work in science, with scientists, and have done for over a decade. Worked with docs in a med college before that.

Yes, on the whole, they take psychology and psychiatry seriously. They do it mainly because we don't know enough about the brain to do without it yet. Do they regard psychologists as doctors, no, but there's some level of respect.

Evopsych is not taken seriously because it's a transparent attempt at misusing biological science (in boneheaded ways that demonstrate that the evopsych guys don't understand the papers they're reading) to support obviously retrograde social theory. Which annoys biologists, many of whom work in evolution.

Well...you do have to be able to communicate. Partly because it's seldom one person making a thing, partly because you have to be able to show other people what you're doing and make them see why it's valuable. But I used to work with engineering students who had your attitude, and it can be lethal. You don't want to cross a bridge designed by engineers who can't communicate with each other. Our space program has imploded for similar reasons.

Well...you do have to be able to communicate. Partly because it's seldom one person making a thing, partly because you have to be able to show other people what you're doing and make them see why it's valuable. But I used to work with engineering students who had your attitude, and it can be lethal. You don't want to cross a bridge designed by engineers who can't communicate with each other. Our space program has imploded for similar reasons.

Well...you do have to be able to communicate. Partly because it's seldom one person making a thing, partly because you have to be able to show other people what you're doing and make them see why it's valuable. But I used to work with engineering students who had your attitude, and it can be lethal. You don't want to cross a bridge designed by engineers who can't communicate with each other. Our space program has imploded for similar reasons.

Subsequent to reporting my findings, I was ordered to MSFC [NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center] to present a preliminary report prior to formal FRR [Flight Readiness Report] meetings.

I participated in the formal FRR's for flight 51E which was scheduled for an April launch. The presentations were given at MSFC in February at three successively higher level review boards with exclusions and refinements in content made at each board level. I spoke about my belief that the low ambient temperature prior to launch was responsible for such a large witness of hot gas (approximately 5500 °F [3040 °C]) blow-by but NASA Program Management insisted on that position being softened for higher and final review board presentations.

[He included the final FFR assessment here.]

I returned to MTI in Utah and met with Arnie Thompson, who was the Supervisor of Structural Design and Analysis for the SRM case segments, to discuss the hot gas blow-by scenario and the affects of cold temperature on O-ring resiliency, which we defined as the ability of the seal to restore itself to a round cross sectional shape after the squeeze on the seal is removed. The preliminary resiliency testing, which was requested by Arnie Thompson, was performed in March and showed that a low temperature of 50 °F (10 °C) was a problem, as the seal material could not follow the rate of gap opening and lost contact with its mating surface. The significance of this data was that the seal erosion and blow-by problem was known to occur within 0.60 seconds during the motor ignition transient. The data was discussed with MTI Engineering Management, but was thought to be too sensitive by them to release to anyone.

Another post flight inspection was performed in June, 1985, at MTI facilities in Utah on a nozzle joint from Flight 51B (SRM 16A) which was launched on April 29, 1985.

[He included diagrams.]

The secondary seal in the same joint was eroded to a depth of 0.032 inches (0.81 mm) but sealed as expected. It was postulated from the evidence that the primary seal had not sealed during the full two minutes of booster flight.

My former concerns about seal erosion and blow-by now escalated because if the same scenario should occur in a field joint, the secondary seal could also be compromised because it was a bore seal instead of the very safe face seal in the nozzle joint. This heightened concern was especially true for a low temperature launch because of the preliminary test results on seal resiliency at 50 °F (10 °C).

An FRR was held at MSFC on July 1, 1985 for flight 51F which was scheduled for launch on July 29, 1985, with an additional presentation given on July 2nd which covered the overall problem status with all the booster seals. The preliminary test results on O-ring resiliency that were obtained in March and kept secret were presented to NASA for the first time at this meeting.

The preliminary test configuration placed an O-ring seal into a flight size groove in a flat plate and compressed the seal 0.040 inches (1.02 mm) with another flat plate. After temperature conditioning of the assembly, the plates were separated 0.030 inches (0.76 mm) at a 2.0 inch (5.08 cm) per minute rate to simulate a flight rate of approximately 3.2 inches (8.13 cm) per minute (slightly unconservative).

The test results showed no loss of seal contact at 100 °F (38 °C); loss of seal contact for 2.4 seconds at 75 °F (24 °C) and loss of seal contact for in excess of 10 minutes at 50 °F (10 °C). The testing also showed that a larger diameter seal (0.295 in - 7.49 mm) lost contact for 2 to 3 seconds at 50 °F (10 °C). This showed that the larger diameter seal performed at 50 °F (10 °C) similar to the operational flight seal (0.280 in - 7.11 mm) at 75 °F (24 °C), which was why the larger seal was being considered for a short-term fix.

Everyone on the program, working with the joint seal problems, was now aware of the influence of low temperature on the field joint seals.

Again, my concern about the joints increased due to the lack of attention being given to this problem by MTI. My notebook entry on August 15,1985 reads as follows: "An attempt to form the team (I was referring to the SIRM Seal Erosion Task Team) was made on 19 July 1985. This attempt virtually failed and resulted in my writing memo 2870:FY86:073. This memo finally got some response and a team was formed officially. The first meeting was held on August 15, 1985 at 2:30 p.m." The memo I referred to is the one I wrote to the Vice President of Engineering at MTI on July 31, 1985. The memo was stamped COMPANY PRIVATE by my boss and had a very limited distribution until I read it to the Presidential Commission on February 25, 1986. The memo reads as follows:

"Subject: SRM O-Ring Erosion/Potential Failure Criticality. This letter is written to insure that management is fully aware of the seriousness of the current O-ring erosion problem in the SRM joints from an engineering standpoint. The mistakenly accepted position on the joint problem was to fly without fear of failure and to run a series of design evaluations which would ultimately lead to a solution or at least a significant reduction of the erosion problem. This position is now drastically changed as a result of the SRM 16A nozzle joint erosion which eroded a secondary O-ring with the primary O-ring never sealing.

"If the same scenario should occur in a field joint (and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the success or failure of the joint because the secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis opening rate and may not be capable of pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe of the highest order--loss of human life.

"An unofficial team (a memo defining the team and its purpose was never published) with leader was formed on 19 July 1985 and was tasked with solving the problem for both the short and long term. This unofficial team is essentially nonexistent at this time. In my opinion, the team must be officially given the responsibility and the authority to execute the work that needs to be done on a noninterference basis (full-time assignment until completed).

"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem, with the field joint having the number one priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad facilities."

The memo was signed by R. M. Boisjoly and concurred to by J. R. Kopp, Manager, Applied Mechanics, who was my boss."