Hezbollah and its intentions and capabilities?

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Beginning in the 1980s, Hezbollah and other international terrorist organizations took root in unstable portions of Latin America. Over the years, they have built up considerable capabilities that threaten US national security and the security of allies in the region. However, Hezbollah has separated itself from its counterparts through its actions in Latin America, namely the Israeli Embassy and AMIA bombings in the early 1990s, and continues to do so. While it mainly operates out of the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina in South America, Hezbollah commands cells that span the Western Hemisphere. In the modern-day, Hezbollah conducts drug, weapons, and contraband trafficking and smuggling operations, in addition to its violent attacks. New revelations, involving the increased trafficking and stealing of nuclear and WMD material, populate the world’s nonproliferation roundtables. Latin America is no exception to this trend. It is possible that terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, could acquire, develop, and use stolen or illegally obtained nuclear material in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or some form of WMD. In light of these revelations, the United States should focus more on Hezbollah’s illicit activities in Latin America in the interests of its own national security and its allies’.

Twice in four days, Hezbollah carried out two successful and significant drone attacks on Israeli positions in the North. On January 6, it was the IAF’s traffic control base on Mount Meron, while on January 9, it was the IDF’s Northern Command Headquarters in Safed. Serious tactical errors contributed to the success of both attacks, though the impact of the latter one was minor.
Then, an anti-tank missile was launched at Moshav Kfar Yuval, killing Mira Ayalon, 79, and her son Barak, 45.

What is the significance of these attacks?
Tactically, the air force installation had been attacked by Hezbollah before, and is close enough to the border that it should have prepared for an anti-tank missile threat – it has only prepared for rocket threats.

In the region, the Iron Dome and other air defense capabilities do provide coverage, but those defenses only shoot down rockets, which fly higher and on an arc-like trajectory.
Anti-tank missiles fly lower and in a straight line at the target, which are usually heavily armored vehicles, but can easily destroy a house.

The IDF has the Trophy defense system, to block such threats for a single armored land vehicle, but has not deployed defenses for larger areas – like an army base.

This all puts a real dent in the IAF’s capabilities and intelligence detection.

However, The Jerusalem Post has learned that the IDF does have redundancies: surveillance operators, mobile surveillance resources, and combat fighters performing intelligence collection operations.

A few years ago, the combat collection battalion had around 750 troops, with 100 emergency call-ups, and probably has much more in the middle of the current war, with the military’s full reserve complement of 360,000 having been called up in October.

Already in recent years, radars, which are far more advanced than optics detection systems and capable of seeing through foliage, have been used. The main system has been Elbit’s MARS ground surveillance system, which consists of surveillance cameras for different ranges and with different resolutions.

When the radar system spots something, the optical system is alerted and takes up the monitoring process. When it was introduced, the MARS system was hailed due to its ability to be controlled by one operator, whereas the prior system needed to be manned by six.
The Post understands that there are other mobile surveillance and detection systems on the ground posted in parts of the North. However, ground surveillance systems have inherent limitations.

There is also a whole fleet of older spy planes with updated surveillance systems, the Post understands, some of which can see up to 100 kilometers away, including to Damascus, from the Israeli side of the Golan – without even having to enter Syrian airspace at all.

Previously, IDF Lt.-Col. S. told The Post that his unit’s aircraft had “enhanced monitors which collect intelligence for the IDF’s target bank, for intelligence surveillance in general and a variety of special operations.”

A novel aspect of this unit is that “sometimes a representative from the land forces sits in the aircraft with us,” he said. “Earlier, the representative would have presented a briefing about what their mission is, what they are afraid might go wrong, what they want the aircraft to gather in terms of intelligence.

“Combining meeting on the ground earlier with flying together in the air creates deep synergy. This works,” S. added.

They can start surveying far-off areas sometimes after only a few minutes from takeoff since if the areas are open, their long-range cameras and sensors can already be used en route to the destination.

In August, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) said that its MAR2 Oron aircraft could be operational in the coming months. The IDF has declined to answer whether the aircraft is currently in use.
If it is, the MARS 2 spy aircraft mixes many of the physical aspects of the older Gulfstream G550 aircraft with a host of newly installed technologies. The 122nd Nachshon Air Force Squadron would be due to operate the aircraft.

This AI also knows how to focus more attention on more immediately actionable intelligence, including selecting some of its targets.

The aircraft is faster, can fly higher, travel farther, for about 15-16 hours, and its intelligence surveillance capabilities extend farther than other previous spy aircraft in Israel’s repertoire.
It can see and analyze issues hundreds of kilometers away, whereas many other systems only detect issues at much closer ranges.

Not only does its spying capabilities have higher resolution, a more sophisticated mix of different sensors, and greater interoperability than previous similar aircraft, but it projects its surveillance in all directions.

What's stopping Hezbollah from attacking Israel with thousands of rockets
If Hezbollah surprised Israel with anti-tank missiles in the above three locations with a few dozen rockets, anti-tank missiles, and drones – without breaking a sweat – what is there to stop it from surprising the IDF with 8,000 rockets all at once against Haifa or Tel Aviv?

To date, the IDF has tried to keep Hezbollah on its heels by attacking it, including with simultaneous attacks on Wadi Saluki on Tuesday.

The IDF has also killed Hezbollah’s drone chief Ali Hussein Bergi, with the terrorist group accusing Jerusalem of killing Hezbollah’s Radwan chief Wissam al-Tawil.

There is no question that Hezbollah has moved back many of its forces from the border and that around 180 Hezbollah and Hamas-affiliated fighters were killed in Lebanon compared to around 20 IDF soldiers to date.

But until the IDF figures out how to thread the needle perfectly – hit assets or persons critical enough to Hezbollah to get it to move all of its forces away from the border and beyond anti-tank missile range, without overstepping into a general war – it will be hard for Israel to translate its military superiority into long-term sustainable security gains.

Hamas are just schoolboys compared to Hezbollah when it comes to terrorism.

It seems you are totally not aware of the internal terrorism they did to Lebanese since 2005.

In 2008, a power struggle between Hezbollah and its Lebanese political adversaries, who had the backing of the West and Saudi Arabia, spiralled into a brief conflict. Hezbollah fighters took over parts of Beirut after the government vowed to take action against the group's military communications network.

More importantly, do any of us have a right to judge them? The genocide of Palestinians has been going on for decades, it's reached a boiling point in the last four months, and after a certain point... well... At a certain point, you have to accept that the response to genocide is gonna look just as bloody and awful as the genocide itself. What right do I have to judge them, for their ruthless pursuit of justice? What right do any of us have?

Turnabout is, in this exceptional instance, fair play. The Soviets turned Germany's whole entire world upside down and we all agree they deserved it.

https://twitter.com/MountLebanonGov

@Mona; Hezbollah’s biggest terrorist sin is stealing the voice of all other Lebanese when it comes to foreign policy.
I know you heard the “Israel is the only democratic country in the middle east” but that’s a Western hyperbole bullcrap; Lebanon’s system (besides Turkey and Cyprus too) *is* practically democratic; the Parliament composition does accurately represents the local groups, including Hezbollah, voting is private, and no one is putting their vote in the ballot at a gunpoint.
Ans here’s the thing, Hezbollah and its allies don’t have the majority representation of the Parliament.
And yet, it seems to be acting as the sole ruler on foreign policy, war decisions and alliances (such as attacking other Arab countries, ie. inviting hamas leaders to sneak in) without any consideration of other parties.

In case you didn’t get what’s in this link; this is a movement for an independent ethno-national stare called Mount Lebanon; and they want to revive the Syriac language as its official language*.

The Maronites, which form the backbone majority of this area; are ethnically Syriacs despite them following the Catholic theology.
They stopped speaking Aramaic-Syriac in the 13th century due to the Arab cultural dominance (and other reasons like the Maronites adopting Catholicism which has ruptured their ties with other Syriac groups in the region, and the big Arabic-Syriac similarity) but it remains their liturgical spoken by their clerics and used in pray masses (besides Arabic).
The Lebanese dialect of Arabic (spoken by all Lebanese) is literally a mixture of Arabic and Syriac.

Splitting Lebanon into ethno-centred states is obviously bad; and I don’t see it feasible much but it’s a symptom of the disease, not the problem. They are simply getting fed up by Hezbollah’s monopoly on state foreign affairs and frankly… they don’t care much for the Palestinian cause much due to a bloody history with the PLO. Many groups are dreaming of a Lebanon-sans-Hezbollah; it is impossible to « fix » Hezbollah.

The proposed Anthem, in Syriac.

https://x.com/mountlebanongov/status/17 ... 23516?s=46

If anyone is lost about what the future holds for the Israel-Hezbollah conflict - don’t feel bad.

The constant threats, varying verbiage and voluminous number of attacks back and forth are extremely difficult to cut through and understand.

However, after multiple recent visits to the North, briefings with top officials, discussions with rank-and-file soldiers, and checking in with other key sources, The Jerusalem Post can “translate” and separate the key developments from less crucial ones.

Neither side is interested in general war
First of all, despite a rise in threats from both the Israeli and Hezbollah sides, neither side is actually angling to open up a much larger general war anytime soon.

This sounds counterintuitive after days in which multiple top Israeli officials said that Israel and Hezbollah are closer to conflict than ever, and where Hezbollah Chief Hassan Nasrallah has himself rattled his saber more loudly in each speech.

Actions louder than words
However, there are some actions and facts which matter far more than the words.

In the last month or so and even more in recent weeks, the IDF has attacked close to 15 villages which Hezbollah was using for cover to fire on Israel’s North.

During the middle of last week, the IDF significantly upped its level of attack when it fired on Hezbollah fighters and positions at the Wadi Saluki Village dozens of times in a matter of hours.

Until then, the IDF had mostly done much smaller scale attacks on the villages, and this was after months where the IDF had not struck the villages at all, and had only been willing to attack Hezbollah rocket crews in open areas.

This shift has hurt Hezbollah, recalibrated its calculations of how it will try to prolong its firing on Israel and is much more important than any verbiage.

The result has been that the IDF as of around a month ago had pushed about 50% of Hezbollah’s 6,000 Radwan forces back from the border with Israel, and that percentage is now closer to 75%, The Jerusalem Post has learned.

The Post also understands that the IDF has been even more successful in destroying Hezbollah’s watchtowers on the border, destroying or damaging between 80-95% depending on what one considers damaged versus destroyed.

Besides that grand scale of military actions which are changing the playing field, the IDF admitted to assassinating Hezbollah drone chief Ali Hussein Bergi and the terror group has accused Jerusalem of killing Hezbollah’s Radwan chief Wissam al-Tawil.

These did not change the playing field on the ground as much, but were a direct hit on Nasrallah’s confidence as they made it clearer than any verbiage that the IDF was and is willing to take off the gloves even against top Hezbollah officials if the terror group crosses certain lines.

War with Hezbollah unlikely in the foreseeable future
From Nasrallah’s perspective, he does not need a bigger war to claim victory.

He succeeded at getting around 80,000 Israelis to evacuate the North and has shown he can maintain fire on Israel for more than 100 days and counting, by firing under 3,000 times – meaning without making a dent in his arsenal of 150,000 rockets and mortars.

All he needs to do is try not to lose face too much or give up too much before a new ceasefire kicks into place.

And while he views the world differently than Westerners, he certainly prefers not having Beirut and Lebanon looking like the significantly destroyed Gaza Strip.

Israel and the IDF leadership, for their part, are highly split on what to do with Hezbollah.

All of the key political and defense officials are in favor of trying to get a diplomatic deal in which Hezbollah withdraws 100% of its Radwan forces from the border with Israel if possible, with war only as a second choice.

But some in the IDF think that a firm ultimatum and deadline should be given to Hezbollah sooner than later.

Some top IDF officials who - before the war might have been leaning more aggressively to want to attack Hezbollah sooner with a preemptive strike to start what they viewed as an inevitable conflict on Israeli terms – counterintuitively now may feel more patient to wait for a later date.

If some IDF officials view Hezbollah’s actions injecting itself into the war between Israel and Hamas and the more than 100 days of northern residents being evacuated as an affrontery that must be corrected immediately, others believe Israel’s actions in the last month or so have altered the picture.

Having pushed back such a substantial amount of Hezbollah’s forces, they feel the chance of Hezbollah mounting an attack is the lowest it has been in years and that this also buys more time for the IDF to delay a preemptive strike to some more opportune moment in the distant future.

Still, others are terrified of what Hezbollah can do to Israel’s home front if it releases its full arsenal, even though Israel would doubtlessly “win” such a conflict in terms of killing and destroying more Hezbollah forces and infrastructure in absolute terms.

Put simply, they view Israel as less able to tolerate losses to the home front than the Lebanese terror group.

Weather also matters, and finding a big war mid-winter could hurt Israel’s ability to exploit its higher-quality military capabilities.

Finally, some do not want to start a major fight with Hezbollah until either Khan Yunis is subdued, still months away, or an even later date of Gaza itself being stabilized and beyond an immediate risk of Hamas returning to take over.

A general war could still break out tomorrow if one side or another miscalculates and pushes the other too far.

I think it would be great to see a revival of Aramaic (the language of Jesus) as a spoken language, but they don't need a separate little Maronite Christian country to do that.

What proportion of Lebanese people want to split up into little ethno-states rather than just expel Hezbollah and/or grant independence to Hezbollah-land?

I think it would be great to see a revival of Aramaic (the language of Jesus) as a spoken language, but they don't need a separate little Maronite Christian country to do that.